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Selection Procedure and Responses to 
Affirmative Action 
The Case of Favorable Treatment* 
R u p e r t  W .  N a c o s t e t  
Although it has been recognized that a large number of issues linked to the social policy of affirmative 
action are of a social psychological nature, research investigating such issues has not considered the 
social psychological importance of implementation procedures. Social policy analysts have differen- 
tiated implementation procedures on the degree to which they include relevant achievement criteria. 
In the present research this differentiation is couched within the theoretical framework of procedural 
justice and is utilized to critique the work of Austin et al. (1977). These researchers investigated the 
responses of individuals favorably treated in an affirmative action like situation and conclude that 
affirmative action is evaluated as "absolutely" unfair by these individuals. Based on the critique, a 
2 (qualifications) • 2 (history of discrimination) • 2 (procedure) role play experiment was conducted. 
The results of the experiment unambiguously support the hypothesis that implementation procedure 
will greatly affect a variety of individual responses such as general affect, evaluations of procedural 
fairness, evaluations of outcome fairness, and evaluations of a relevant subunit of the involved insti- 
tution. 
I N T R O D U C T I O N  
Affirmative action is an issue which has captured some attention from sociai 
psychologists. For the most part social psychologists have focused on reactions 
to the proposal of affirmative action and thereby attempted to provide some 
explanation for these reactions. These attempts have varied from mere specula- 
tion derived from a particular theoretical framework such as equity (see Walster, 
Berscheid, & Walster, 1976), to empirical investigations of attitudes toward affir- 
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mative action proposals utilizing opinion surveys (e.g., Rothbart, 1976), as well 
as experimental research investigating the role of attitudes toward a targeted 
group (e.g., blacks) in responses to possible variations of the social policy (see 
Jones & Cook, 1975). Most recently, attention has been directed toward potential 
social psychological consequences linked to the presence of affirmative action 
programs (for example, Garcia, Erskine, Hawn, & Casmay, 1981; solomon, 
Moehle, & Schopler, Note 1). Research of particular interest has focused on the 
reactions of individuals affected by affirmative action. 
Austin, Friedman, Martz, Hooe, and Ball (1977) investigated the responses 
of individuals positively affected within an experimentally realized affirmative 
action like situation. Manipulating individual qualifications and later success on 
the job, these researchers demonstrate the impact of those variables on measures 
of mood, ratings of deservingness and fairness of the selection procedure. In two 
experiments, little absolute change was observed in the ratings of the fairness of 
the selection procedure. In both cases the grand mean of these ratings did not 
move above the midpoint of the 100 point scale. Consequently, Austin et al. 
conclude that " . . . the procedure of affirmative sexual discrimination renders 
situations unfair even when normal standards of distributive justice are satisfied" 
(p. 292). 
Throughout their discussion Austin et al. (1977) suggest that they have dem- 
onstrated that the procedure of affirmative action is viewed as unfair by the 
recipients of the favorable treatment. This argument seems premature given that 
they make no procedural comparisons. There is reason to believe that manipu- 
lations of type of procedure, above and beyond a particular distribution bias is 
necessary. 
In a series of investigations, Thibaut and Walker (1975) and others (Latour et 
al., 1976; Houlden et al., 1976; Lind et al., 1978) have demonstrated a variety of 
components which influence the perception of a procedure as fair. Generally, the 
distribution of control between disputants and a third party decisionmaker seems 
the prepotent variable. This factor is important in spite of the manner in which 
outcomes are finally distributed. Of course, conclusions regarding the effect of 
procedure can only be legitimately offered where comparisons between proce- 
dures have been obtained. Still, Austin et al. (1977) make the aforementioned 
statement, in spite of the lack of any manipulation of levels or types of procedure. 
In effect, the conclusion drawn by Austin et al. (1977) assumes that there is 
only one possible implementation procedure for the institution of a program of 
affirmative action or at least that only one is used. This assumption however is 
at variance with the state of argument and controversy surrounding affirmative 
action which clearly concerns the manner in which it should be implemented and 
the political and psychological implications of utilizing one or another procedure 
(Bolner, 1977; Gilbert & Eaton, 1977). Much of the litigation surrounding affir- 
mative action seems not to focus on the rightness or wrongness of the concept 
of equal opportunity and the making of reparations to historically disadvantaged 
groups, but seems aimed at questions of procedure. One might reasonably con- 
clude that most of the litigation and controversy has arisen at least in part as a 
feature of the search for a proper and/or fair procedure. 
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Indeed, even among those individuals on different sides of the issue this point 
provides some common ground. For example, Thomas Sowell, an economist who 
is an opponent of affirmative action notes the following: 
Many different policies have gone under the general label of "affirmative action",  and 
many different organizations--courts ,  executive agencies, and even private organiza- 
t i o n s - h a v e  got involved in formulating or interpreting the meaning of that term. The 
conflicting tendencies  and pressures  of these various inst i tut ions have shifted the 
meaning of "affirmative action" and produced inconsistent concepts at the same time. 
There is no way to determine the meaning of "affirmative action". All that can be done 
is to examine the particulars, the concepts, intentions and actual effects. [1976, p. 49]. 
Likewise, Seligman (1973), who is ideologically in favor of affirmative action, 
observes the following: 
In most of the controversy over quotas, there is no real disagreement about ultimate 
objectives. Most educated Americans today would agree that several minorities, and 
women, suffer from discrimination in employment, that the discrimination is destructive 
and irrational, and that working to end it is a proper activity for government. Unfortu- 
nately, it is not clear what government should do and all too clear that wise policies do 
not flow naturally from good intentions [p. 161]. 
The availability of discussions of this type provides a sound basis for arguing 
that affirmative action is not an all or none issue. Likewise, discussions of various 
postures of nondiscrimination (for example, Pottinger, 1972; Seligman, 1973) sug- 
gest that there are a number of possible implementational variations, and the 
utilization of a variety of procedures has been documented (see U.S. Commission 
on Civil Rights, 1977, and Supreme Court of the United States, University of 
California v. Bakke, 1978). Thus Austin et al. (1977) do not manipulate what is 
minimally required to enable them to draw conclusions regarding procedure. 
Moreover, it may be that they have not manipulated what is a crucial determinant 
of responses to affirmative action. 
In a relevant paper, Gilbert and Eaton (1977) discuss favoritism as a strategy 
for compensating those who are disadvantaged, in some sense, as a result of 
discrimination. Though they restrict themselves to the area of racial discrimina- 
tion their observations are also applicable to the area of sexual discrimination. 
Gilbert and Eaton (1977) make a distinction between preferential treatment 
and discrimination-in-reverse as strategies of favoritism. They define preferential 
treatment as follows: 
A social policy in compensation for past services, past or present injustices or handicaps, 
whereby affiliation with a group of victims is included as one of the relevant criteria 
given positive weight in determining the allocation of services, opportunities and re- 
sources [p. 56]. 
Discrimination-in-reverse is defined as follows: 
A social policy in compensation for past services, past or present injustices, or handi- 
caps, whereby the allocation of services, opportunities, and resources is based primarily 
upon group affiliation, to the exclusion or subordination of technically relevant criteria 
for determining such allocations [p. 57]. 
In their conceptual analysis of these "procedures" Gilbert and Eaton note 
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that the major difference between them is the role of achievement criteria. Plainly 
embodied in the notion of preferential treatment is the concept of an achievement 
criterion. However, this is not the case in the procedure of discrimination-in- 
reverse. As they view it, "Discrimination-in-reverse subordinates considerations 
of individual achievement to a desired social policy objective" (p. 59). That is, 
the procedure of discrimination-in-reverse has as a basic component the notion 
of absolute advantage to a once oppressed group in competition for "esteemed 
social roles" or any scarce resource. 
Having conceptualized these procedural possibilities, Gilbert and Eaton 
(1977) go on to raise the question of the implications of their utilization. Lacking 
any comparative data they make no definitive statements regarding the conse- 
quences of the implementation of either procedure but do speculate that discrim- 
ination-in-reverse would be generally object ionable to members  of society. 
Casting the procedures in the light of findings in the domain of procedural justice 
provides at least some conceptual validity to their speculation. 
As mentioned, researchers in the area of procedural justice having investi- 
gated various factors involved in the perception of a procedure as fair point to 
the importance of distribution of control (Thibaut & Walker, 1975). Briefly, dis- 
tribution of control has to do with whether or not the procedure allows disputants 
or litigants some degree of control over the proceedings. In the legal setting this 
has to do with disputants' opportunity to choose a representative and through 
that representative present their side of the case in the most favorable light pos- 
sible. Speaking in more general terms the procedure perceived as fairer insures 
that the involved parties will have the opportunity to present particular circum- 
stances, that is, equity considerations surrounding their situation. 
Thus legal procedures may be thought of as varying in the degree to which 
they provide the mechanisms through which any equity inputs of disputants will 
be considered. This conceptualization can be extended to the two procedures 
considered by Gilbert and Eaton (1977) for the implementing of reparations to 
disadvantaged groups. The procedure referred to as preferential treatment clearly 
takes into account equity inputs, in this instance merit or achievement factors. 
The procedure referred to as discrimination-in-reverse however does not do so, 
making a commitment to the idea of absolute advantage and eschewing techni- 
cally relevant criteria. One might consider the distinction between the two as 
at least analogous to the distinction (made in the procedural justice literature) 
between an equity and a legalistic procedure. Given this, it seems reasonable to 
hypothesize that certain procedural variations will have important and different 
social psychological consequences. 
In line with this reasoning, an experiment is conducted which investigates 
the role of procedure in responses to outcome distributions carried out in a 
manner consistent with the general thrust of affirmative action. The experiment 
parallels in many respects the work of Austin et al. (1977), in particular the role 
play study. Aside from the general theoretical issue of concern, this research 
is conducted in the belief that Austin et al. have provided a base for investigating 
a potentially large problem area in settings where affirmative action is accepted 
policy, that being the personal distress which might be suffered by minority in- 
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dividuals. It is of course of some importance to investigate whether one affir- 
mative action procedure is more likely than another to lead to distress and self- 
doubt amongst minority individuals. 
Experimental Variables and Predictions 
In the investigation three independent variables are manipulated: quaIifica- 
tions, procedure, and past history of discrimination. The manipulation of quali- 
fication follows that used by Austin et al. (1977) and is expected independently 
to influence mood responses, ratings of the fairness of the procedure and feelings 
of deservingness. Subjects in the superior qualifications condition are expected 
to show more positive mood, perceived fairness, and rated deservingness than 
those in the nonsuperior condition. If the predictions hold, the results would 
replicate the findings obtained by Austin et al. for the qualifications variable. 
The procedure manipulation is of course carried out in a manner consistent 
with the distinction drawn between a preferential treatment procedure and a dis- 
crimination-in-reverse procedure. This manipulation is expected to influence rat- 
ings of the fairness of the procedure and also the amount of personal distress (or 
negative mood) displayed by individuals experiencing favorable treatment. Sub- 
jects in the preferential treatment condition are expected to evaluate the proce- 
dure as fairer as well as showing more positive mood than those in the discrim- 
ination-in-reverse condition. 
A manipulation of past history of institutional discrimination is introduced 
because this potential variable was confounded with other variables in the Austin 
et al. role play study. In the scenario used by these researchers the statement 
that, "It  was apparent to the committee that too much money has been awarded 
to (male or female) faculty members" (p. 294) was present across conditions. 
Manipulation of this variable is expected to have impact on ratings of fairness, 
overall deservingness as well as measures of mood or affect. Subjects made aware 
of some history of discrimination are expected to respond more positively toward 
the final decision, show more positive affect, as well as demonstrate stronger 
feelings of deservingness than those who are not aware. 
M E T H O D  
Subjects  
Ninety-six female undergraduate introductory psychology students at the 
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill participated in the experiment. Par- 
ticipation in experiments was a partial requirement for course credit. 
Independent Variables 
The experimental factors manipulated were qualifications, procedure and 
past history of institutional discrimination. Two levels of each variable are ma- 
nipulated. Thus the experimental design is 2 (qualifications) • 2 (history) x 2 
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(procedure).  Subjects  were  randomly  assigned to each condition in equal num- 
bers.  Thus the design is comple te ly  or thogonal  with 12 subjects in each condition. 
P r o c e d u r e  
Subjects repor ted  to an exper imenta l  room for participation in an exper iment  
entitled "Dec i s ion  Eva lua t ions . "  Subjects were  greeted by a male exper imenter  
who brought  them into the exper imenta l  room where  they were  seated. The 
exper imenter  then told the subjects that the general focus of  the exper iment  they 
would be part icipating in was decision making. Continuing, the exper imenter  
informed the subjects that he had been doing research on various aspects  of  
decision making and trying to apply that  research to some issues that arise in 
business and industry. The  purpose  of  the part icular  s tudy the subjects would be 
participating in was said to be understanding how people  evaluate decisions made 
by commit tees .  To accompl ish  this subjects would be asked to read a story and 
try and put themselves  in the place of  one of the individuals in the story. The 
exper imenter  went  on to say that  putting yourse l f  in the place of  one of the 
persons  simply means  responding as if what  happens  to them actually happens 
to you. Subjects were  informed that once they had read the story they would be 
given a quest ionnaire  which they should complete  as if they were the individual 
in the story. At this point  subjects  were  asked to take a folder which contained 
further instructions and the scenario.  Subjects picked a folder f rom a set of  avail- 
able folders and were  then directed to cubicles where  they read a set of  instruc- 
tions and the scenario.  
The instructions were  as follows: 
As the experimenter has already indicated, what you are being asked to do is to place 
yourself in the position of one of the people in the story you read in order to evaluate 
a decision affecting the individual. While you are reading the story and afterwards you 
should try to imagine how you would have felt and how you would have evaluated the 
decision process. Then fill out the questionnaire that follows. 
The story concerns two college professors applying for a research grant. This particular 
situation is similar to that of applying for a job with a business firm. As you read the 
story, place yourself in the position of Professor Barbara Macklin. You should assume 
that Professor Macklin is aware of all the information you read including the manner in 
which the decision is made. 
The scenario itself centered around the offering of a $10,000.00 research 
award by  the English depar tment  at a large universi ty in the United States.  It 
was after " a  long and tedious selection process  that the field of  compet i t ive 
appl ica t ions  had been  n a r r o w e d  down  to two  p r o f e s s o r s , "  a male  p rofessor ,  
James  Freeman,  and a female  professor ,  Barbara  Macklin. At this point in the 
scenario the qualification manipulat ion was introduced by  the following state- 
ment: 
The selection committee is in unanimous agreement that (the male or female professor) 
possesses superior qualifications. 
The scenario continued: 
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However, the committee also had to be sensitive to university administration pressure 
concerning the proper distribution of research money on the basis of the researchers 
sex. The Department of Health, Education and Welfare had recently cut funds to those 
universities who had disproportionately allocated funds. 
At this point a statement relevant to a past history of discrimination was 
either included (clear history of discrimination) or omitted (ambiguous history 
condition). When included, the statement read as follows: 
A university wide evaluation of the distribution of funds on the basis of sex had clearly 
demonstrated that this committee had in the past awarded far too much money to male 
applicants. 
The remainder of the scenario constituted the manipulation of procedure and in 
the inequity (or the discrimination-in-reverse) procedure condition read as fol- 
lows: 
The current policy of the university administration states that sex of the applicant is to 
be considered very important. Because of this consideration the committee decided to 
award the grant to Professor Macklin. This was ultimately the basis for their final de- 
cision. 
This is equivalent to the procedure utilized by Austin et al. (1977). 
In the equity (or preferential treatment) procedure condition the scenario 
read as follows: 
The current policy of the university administration states that sex of an applicant is only 
to be considered when it has been determined that the applicants have the necessary 
level of qualification. Taking both sex and qualifications under consideration the com- 
mittee decided to award the grant to Professor Macktin. The weighting of both qualifi- 
cations and sex constituted the basis for their final decision. 
After reading the scenario subjects completed a questionnaire. The ques- 
tionnaire was designed to check manipulations, measure mood states, perceptions 
of fairness of the procedure, fairness of the final decision, feelings of control over 
the decision, perceptions of the competence of the committee, the degree to which 
they felt the selection procedure favored themselves or the other professor, like- 
lihood that they would have reached the same decision as the committee, feelings 
of deservingness, and the extent to which subjects had difficulty placing them- 
selves in the position of Professor Macklin. Subjects responded to these items 
on a 100-millimeter line with appropriate end points. 
Upon completion of the questionnaire subjects were asked what they thought 
of the situation, and how it made them feel personally. Subjects were then de- 
briefed and asked not to discuss the experiment with other introductory psy- 
chology students. 
R E S U L T S  
The dependent variables were submitted to a three-factor analysis of vari- 
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ance. Similar items (e.g., the fairness items) were clustered and analyzed multi- 
variately. 
Manipu la t ion  Checks  
All subjects seemed to have been aware of which professor they had been 
asked to role play. One hundred percent of the subjects responded correctly to 
such an item. Likewise, the manipulation of qualifications appears to have been 
successful. When asked which professor was best qualified to receive the grant 
95.8% of the subjects (46 of 48) responded correctly when they were said to have 
superior qualifications and 87.5% (43 of 48) responded correctly when the other 
professor was said to have superior qualifications. 
As a check on the effectiveness of the procedure manipulation, subjects re- 
sponded to the question, "In the selection procedure used by the committee how 
much importance do you think was given to each professor's qualifications?", 
and also to the question "In the selection procedure used by the committee how 
much importance do you think was given to the sex of each professor?" (see 
Table 1). 
As expected, a multivariate main effect for procedure was obtained [F(1,88) 
= 21.113, p < .001]. The preferential treatment procedure was viewed as giving 
more weight to qualifications than the discrimination-in-reverse procedure  
[F(1,88) = 32.428, p < 0.001] and the discrimination-in-reverse procedure was 
viewed as giving more weight to the sex of the applicant than the preferential 
treatment procedure [F(1,88) = 20.074, p < 0.001]. 
Additionally, a multivariate main effect for qualifications was also obtained 
for these items [F(1,88) = 9.311, p < 0.001]. Subjects role-playing the professor 
described as having superior qualifications felt the procedure gave more weight 
to qualifications than subjects role-playing the other professor [F(1,88) = 17.248, 
p < 0.001]. On the other hand, subjects role playing the professor described as 
having superior qualifications felt that sex was given less weight than subjects 
role-playing the other professor [F(1,88) = 4.910, p < 0.029]. All in all, the 
manipulations appear to have been successful. 
Affective Responses 
Subjects responded to a total of nine mood adjective measures. The mood 
measures were 100-point bipolar items with end points being good/bad, tense/ 
relaxed, pleased/displeased, competent/ incompetent,  complimented/offended, 
happy/unhappy, angry/composed, satisfied/dissatisfied, and irritated/untroubled. 
These items were scored so that higher numbers indicate a more positive (or less 
distressed) response. Scores on these items were summed and a mean of the 
summed score was calculated for each subject (see Table 2). This transformation 
provides what is taken to be a scale of general affect. 1 To ascertain the reliability 
1 A copy of the descriptive statistics (means, standard deviations, etc.) for each of the individual 
affective items is available from the author. 
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of this general affect scale, Cronbach's Alpha was calculated and found to be of 
an acceptable level (Cronbach's Alpha = 0.93). 
Given the evidence that the scale items were measuring the same type of 
response the general affect measure was used as the dependent variable in lieu 
of an analysis of individual items. The analysis revealed that subjects role-playing 
a professor described as having superior qualifications displayed more positive 
affect than subjects role-playing the other professor [F(1,88) = 21.612, p < 0.001]. 
Also subjects in the preferential treatment condition demonstrated more positive 
affect than subjects in the discrimination-in-reverse condition [F(1,88) = 11.475, 
p < 0.001]. 
In addition to main effects for qualifications and procedure, the interaction 
of history and procedure was obtained [F(1,88) = 3.284, p < 0.073]. This inter- 
action seems to be due to the effects of procedure being intensified in the presence 
of historical information implying past discrimination against females. Indeed, 
there is little or no difference between responses by procedural condition in the 
ambiguous history condition (see Table 3). Simple effects tests show no differ- 
ences on the basis of procedure in the ambiguous history condition [F(1,88) = 
1.241, p < 0.27] whereas a significant difference by procedure is obtained in the 
clear history condition [F(1,88) = 13.519, p < 0.001]. 
Fairness and Deservingness 
Subjects responded to two fairness items which were clustered for the anal- 
ysis. One item focused on the fairness of the selection procedure and the other 
on the fairness of the final decision. The analysis revealed multivariate main 
effects for qualifications [F(1,88) = 13.64, p < 0.001] and procedure [F(1,88) = 
10.538, p < 0.001]. Subjects role-playing the professor described as having su- 
perior qualifications viewed the selection procedure [F(1,88) = 5.466, p < 0.022] 
and the final decision [F(1,88) = 27.583, p < 0.001] as fairer than did subjects 
role-playing the other professor. Similarly, both the selection procedure [F(1,88) 
= 11.199, p < 0.001] and the final decision [F(1,88) -- 19.072, p < 0.001] were 
viewed as fairer by subjects in the preferential treatment condition as compared 
to subjects in the discrimination-in-reverse condition. 
Subjects also responded to items regarding deservingness and likelihood of 
reaching the same decision as did the committee. Analysis of these responses 
revealed that subjects in the superior qualifications condition felt more deserving 
of the grant [F(1,88) = 45.526, p < 0.001] as well as indicating a higher likelihood 
of reaching a similar decision [F(1,88) = 35.444, p < 0.001] than did subjects in 
the not superior qualifications condition. Furthermore, subjects in the clear his- 
tory condition felt more deserving of the grant than subjects in the ambiguous 
history condition[F(1,88) = 4.490, p < 0.037]. 
Additionally, a significant interaction of qualifications and procedure was 
obtained for subjects' estimation of the likelihood that they would have reached 
the same decision as did the committee [F(1,88) = 5.239, p < 0.024]. This inter- 
action effect is the result of differential responding to the procedure manipulation 
in the superior qualifications condition (see Table 4). Simple effects test reveal 
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Clear history Ambiguous history Clear history Ambiguous history 
73.9 66.0 51.1 59.1 
that the difference between procedure conditions within the superior qualifica- 
tions condition is significant [F(1,88) = 7.112, p < 0.009] whereas the difference 
in the not superior condition is not [F(1,88) = 0.325, ns]. 
Other  D e p e n d e n t  Variables  
Other dependent variable items focused on feelings of control over outcome, 
the degree of control an average other would have in such a situation, the amount 
of control the committee had over the final decision and the selection process, 
the degree to which the selection procedure was viewed as favoring self, the 
degree to which the selection procedure was viewed as favoring the other pro- 
fessor, perceptions of the competence of the committee and finally, the amount 
of difficulty they experienced in placing themselves in the position of the appro- 
priate professor. No reliable effects were obtained on the perceived control vari- 
ables. 
Analysis of the items focusing on the degree to which the procedure favored 
themselves or the other professor revealed a multivariate main effect for history 
[F(1,88) = 3.158, p < 0.047]. Subjects in the clear history condition felt that the 
procedure was less in their favor [F(1,88) = 4.235, p < 0.043] and more in favor 
of the other professor [F(1,88) = 4.96, p < 0.028] than subjects in the ambiguous 
history condition. 
Subjects' evaluation of the committee indicated that subjects thought the 
committee more competent when they were in the superior qualifications con- 
dition as compared to the not superior condition [F(1,88) = 9.79, p < 0.001]. 
Additionally, subjects in the preferential treatment condition evaluated the com- 
mittee more positively than did subjects in the discrimination-in-reverse condition 
[F(1,88) = 13.253, p < 0.001]. 
Finally, subjects responded on a 100-point scale to an item which asked, 
"How difficult was it for you to place yourself in the position of the appropriate 
professor?" The logic underlying the posing of this question involved the possi- 
Table 4. Means for the Interaction of Procedure and Qualifications on Likelihood of 





Superior Not superior Superior Not superior 
80.1 35.2 59.6 39.6 
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bility that subjects who have great difficulty role playing might respond differ- 
entially on affective and fairness measures. Likewise, it seemed necessary to 
check the degree to which the experimental manipulations might affect such dif- 
ficulty. Analysis of this item demonstrated that subjects had less difficulty role 
playing when in the superior qualifications condition than when in the not superior 
qualifications condition [F(1,88) = 12.009, p < 0.001]. 
In order to get some indication of the extent to which difficulty of role playing 
influences responding on major dependent variables, correlations between certain 
dependent variable items and difficulty were calculated. Degree of difficulty role 
playing was correlated with general affect (r = - 0.07), fairness of the selection 
procedure (r = -0.12),  fairness of the final decision (r = -0.10),  and deserv- 
ingness (r = -0.10).  No significant correlations were obtained between difficulty 
of role playing and these major dependent variables. 
D I S C U S S I O N  
The working principle which guided the present experiment was that in order 
to understand responses to affirmative action it would be necessary to concep- 
tualize and manipulate its procedural variates. The results of the experiment 
provide strong empirical support for this general point. Independent procedural 
effects were obtained on dependent variables including general affect, fairness of 
the selection procedure, fairness of the final decision, and evaluation of com- 
mittee competence. Additionally, a significant interaction between qualifications 
and procedure was obtained on the dependent variable item likelihood of reaching 
the same decision as the committee. 
Of some interest is the main effect for procedure on the measure of general 
affect and fairness of the final decision. Although predicted, the full implications 
of these findings are not necessarily apparent. With regard to affective responding 
it was initially thought that obtaining a procedure effect would provide some 
plausible link between procedure and likelihood of successful psychological ad- 
justment to the setting. However, when it became clear that the items were in 
essence measuring a unidimensional general evaluation response, the variables 
were analyzed summarily. Thus no direct evidence is available regarding potential 
adjustment difficulty. The results of the analysis of these responses do however 
demonstrate an effect on subjects' emotional state as a result of the procedure 
utilized. This suggests indirectly that to the extent these measures tap some aspect 
of the affective psychological state, procedure may impact upon adjustment. In 
addition to this, the procedure effect on affective responses suggest that subjects 
were psychologically involved in the situation and not just passive observers. 
This implication can be inferred from work done in the procedural justice tradition 
(e.g., Walker, Lind, & Thibaut, 1979). 
Walker, Lind, and Thibaut (1979) in an attempt to delineate the interrela- 
tionship of procedural and distributive justice investigated the role of participation 
versus nonparticipation in responses to procedural and distributive variables. To 
238 NACOSTE 
accomplish this subjects were differentially linked to the general situation so that 
one set of subjects was directly involved in some litigation, another set was 
involved as the result of having yoked outcomes (e.g., stock holders, or members 
of a certain class of individuals involved in a class action litigation) and finally 
general observers. Of particular interest is the finding that with regard to re- 
sponses to the outcome of the litigation only subjects in a participatory role 
showed more favorable reactions on the basis of the procedure utilized. Regard- 
less of outcome, only subjects actually involved in the litigation showed more 
positivity in their feelings (satisfaction) and ratings of the outcome when an ad- 
versary (or equity-oriented) procedure was utilized than when a nonadversary (or 
legalistically oriented) procedure was utilized. The outcome was viewed as more 
acceptable under the adversary procedure by participating or involved subjects, 
whereas subjects with yoked outcomes and observer subjects show no effects for 
procedure on acceptability of outcome. 
These findings are pertinent to the present results since procedural affects 
were obtained both on subjects' affective responses and on the evaluation of the 
fairness of the outcome. Given that pattern of results it is not unreasonable to 
infer that subjects in the present experiment were psychologically involved in the 
situation. Based on the findings of Walker et al. (1979) these effects would be 
expected only of subjects actively involved in some litigation. 
Returning to the issue of the importance of considering procedural variations 
in the context of affirmative action, recall the conclusion drawn by Austin et al 
(1977). These researchers have argued that the procedure of affirmative action is 
viewed as "absolutely unfair." However, the results of the present experiment 
raise doubts regarding their assertion. It is not clear that the procedure of affir- 
mative action is necessarily unfair. In the present experiment, subjects were ex- 
posed to a situation in which an institutional unit is under some pressure to treat 
females equitably or lose its funding and further the female always receives the 
good outcome. If it were the case that affirmative action were perceived as gen- 
erally unfair then procedure should make no difference. However, a main effect 
for procedure on the fairness of the selection procedure item was obtained. 
Of course, the attainment of differences between two procedures does not 
directly address the charge of absolute unfairness. It is possible to obtain a sta- 
tistically significant difference between two procedures that are generally 
abhorred. The discussion of the absolute fairness rating by Austin et al. suggest 
that they conclude affirmative action is something generally repulsive. Their dis- 
cussion of absolute ratings comes from scrutinization of a grand mean. One weak- 
ness in their argument on this point is their failure to statistically test the differ- 
ence of the grand mean from zero (the absolute unfairness point on the 100-point 
scale). Since in the present experiment two procedures were utilized, it is 
possible to test the difference of the grand mean from zero for each procedure. 
Such an analysis would provide a relevant test of the validity of Austin et al.'s 
arguments. 
It turns out that the grand mean of the selection procedure item for both the 
preferential treatment procedure (grand mean = 59.0) and the grand mean for 
the discrimination-in-reverse procedure (grand mean = 39.1) are significantly 
different from zero [F(1,88) = 197.11, p < 0.001 and F(1,88) = 86.618, p < 0.001, 
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respectively]. Thus it appears that Austin et al.'s claim of absolute unfairness is 
inaccurate. This is true even for the discrimination-in-reverse procedure, which 
is similar to the one used by those researchers. Still, the question of how fair 
these procedures are perceived to be remains of interest. 
It is possible that though these procedures are viewed as encompassing dif- 
ferent degrees of fairness, they are both seen as below or at the midpoint of the 
fairness scale. If this were the case then it would suggest that affirmative action, 
while not absolutely unfair, is nevertheless viewed as generally unfair. To inves- 
tigate this, the difference between the midpoint of the scale (50), the hypothetical 
neutral rating, and each subject's rating of the fairness of the selection procedure 
was calculated (i.e., the subject's rating of the selection procedure minus 50). 
The grand mean of these scores for each procedure was calculated; the grand 
mean for the preferential treatment procedure was + 9.1 and for the discrimina- 
tion-in-reverse procedure was -10.9. Of course a positive grand mean indicates 
that on the average subjects rate the procedure above the midpoint (i.e., as fair), 
whereas a negative grand mean indicates that on the average subjects rate the 
procedure below the midpoint (i.e., as unfair). Again the grand mean test of 
significance from zero is significant for both the discrimination-in-reverse pro- 
cedure [F(1,88) = 6.659, p < 0.001] and the preferential treatment procedure 
[F(1,88) = 4.632, [F(1,88) = 0.034]. In this case, however, the significant differ- 
ences have divergent implications. To the extent that the midpoint is interpretable, 
the fact that the discrimination-in-reverse procedure scores were significantly 
below the midpoint implies that it is viewed as unfair. Likewise, the fact that the 
preferential treatment score is significantly above the midpoint implies that as a 
procedure, it is viewed as fair, although certainly not absolutely fair. 
These findings taken together with that of the general finding of greater 
perceived fairness being linked to the preferential treatment procedure provides 
further indication that affirmative action is not necessarily viewed as unfair. Of 
course, these findings are limited to those favorably treated in an affirmative 
action context. However, it is believed that because of the nature and potency 
of the procedural difference a procedural variation would also mediate the re- 
sponse of those whose outcomes are negatively affected. It appears that the 
inclusion and consideration of achievement criteria (equity concerns), is ai1 ex- 
ceedingly important linkage in understanding an individual's responses to the 
resolution of this type of conflict. 
Other findings worth noting involve the qualification and history of discrim- 
ination variables. Qualifications mediated subjects' affective responses, feelings 
of deservingness as well as evaluations of the selection procedure and committee 
competence. Many of these effects replicate those obtained by Austin et at. 
(1977). More important, these findings point to the necessity of taking into ac- 
count individual's knowledge or perception of their own qualifications. 
The history main effect on deservingness is interesting in its suggestion that 
subjects viewed their individual endeavor in the context of how their group had 
been generally treated in the relevant domain. It appears that because females as 
a group had apparently not been treated fairly, these female subjects generally felt 
more deserving of the good outcome. 
The effects of history of discrimination related to procedural bias are at first 
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somewhat puzzling. Subjects indicated that they felt the selection procedure fa- 
vored them less and the other professor more in the clear history condition. Since 
the scenario subjects read emphasized pressure on the university to allocate funds 
without bias with regards to sex or lose their funding, evidence implicating the 
committee in past discrimination would seem to increase the odds that the com- 
mittee would choose a female. Thus one might have expected a history main 
effect but in the reverse direction of what was actually obtained. 
Although the above reasoning has some intuitive appeal there is another 
possibility. The underlying assumption of the logic outlined was that the infor- 
mation would be viewed by subjects as a constraint on the behavior of the com- 
mittee. Although this is plausible it is not necessarily the case for the favoritism 
items. In terms of which person is favored by the selection procedure it is possible 
that subjects view the history information as an indication of either a structural 
bias of the procedure or as an indication of bias operating in the committee itself. 
When subjects are queried regarding the direction of bias in the procedure utilized 
they are given no information to suggest that the procedure used in their case is 
either new or revamped in any way. It is possible then, that this is the procedure 
which has been used all along. Consequently, when information implying that 
sexual discrimination has occurred in the past is available, drawing the conclusion 
that the procedure utilized does in fact favor males is not unreasonable. The 
history-of-discrimination information may in this case serve as evidence that the 
procedure utilized is defective or flawed in some way. Overall, it appears that 
history of discrimination is an important contextual variable to consider within 
the domain of responses to affirmative action. 
I M P L I C A T I O N S / C O N C L U S I O N S  
The results of the experiment clearly demonstrate the important role of pro- 
cedure in responses to favorable treatment brought about as a function of affir- 
mative action. More specifically, the results demonstrate that different imple- 
mentation procedures of affirmative action have important social psychological 
consequences. An obvious research implication of these findings points to the 
necessity of extending the theoretical reasoning and logic to encompass individ- 
uals in different interdependence locations to the conflict, such as those whose 
outcomes are negatively affected and general observers. In the context of the 
latter, the issue of the negative consequences of affirmative action linked to at- 
tributional discounting processes (Garcia et al., 1981; Solomon et al., Note 1) 
seems particularly amenable to a procedural analysis. 
Moreover, the results of the foregoing experiment suggest some policy im- 
plications. The demonstration of an important role of implementation procedure 
in evaluations of the social policy of affirmative action is particularly significant 
in light of the tone of the Supreme Court decision in the case of University of 
California v. Allan Bakke (1978). Briefly, the Supreme Court, in addressing the 
challenge of an affirmative action policy by Allan Bakke, ruled in favor of Bakke 
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on the basis that the program in question did not provide individualized treatment 
of applicants. At the same time the court ruled that considerations of race, na- 
tional origin, sex, etc. were allowable in an attempt to reach certain goals such 
as remedying the effects of past discrimination and increasing diversity amongst 
the population of the organization in question. In essence the court ruled that 
only the procedure used by the University of California was inappropriate. Thus 
the experiment under discussion, having demonstrated relevant social psycho- 
logical consequences of two potential procedures, should provide additional im- 
petus for those charged with policy implementation to reevaluate their organi- 
zation's current affirmative action stance. And, of course, it is imperative to 
address the practical issues surrounding actual implementation of the procedure 
suggested as "preferred" by this research. 
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